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Article  
Engaging the Oppressor 
Sari Bashi† 
 
Introduction - South Africa 
 
It was June 1995, one year after South Africa’s first democratic elections 
brought anti-Apartheid activist and guerilla fighter Nelson Mandela to 
power. After being barred from the World Cup in 1987 and 1991, South 
Africa was hosting the world Rugby championship. Its national team, the 
Springboks, a symbol of white Afrikaner domination, had made it to the final 
round, fielding a lone black player, Chester Williams. Mandela had spent 
twenty-seven years in prison, many of them under brutal conditions on the 
beautiful but isolated Robben Island, where race classifications dictated even 
the food rations he received – as a black man, he received one ounce less meat 
and a half-ounce less sugar than Indian and colored prisoners.1 In a now-
famous gesture that June day, Mandela walked onto the field at 
Johannesburg’s Ellis Stadium at half-time wearing the Springbok uniform, 
and when the South African team won the championship, he returned to the 
field and raised his green cap in a victory gesture. The message was clear: 
there is a place for everyone in the new South Africa, former oppressor and 
formerly oppressed. We will rebuild this country together. 
It was admirable to embrace one’s oppressor after he had lost his 
monopoly on power.  But Mandela’s inclusiveness began long before South 
Africa’s democratic transition. In 1964, at the height of oppression by the 
Afrikaner ruling government, Mandela was on trial for sabotage. He faced 
the death penalty at the hands of a white judge. Throughout South Africa, 
security forces were using torture, extrajudicial executions, and racist laws 
to maintain a brutal form of racial supremacy that dispossessed blacks of 
their land and relegated them to far-flung “townships,” to be admitted into 
white urban centers only as laborers bearing passes. In a speech at his trial, 
Mandela, the co-founder of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of 
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1. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela 344 (1994). 
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the African National Congress (ANC), enumerated the devastating effects of 
white domination on black lives: death, poverty, poor education, family 
separation, illness, and others. He then addressed the fears of the Afrikaner 
minority against whose government he had planned a sabotage campaign: 
Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our  
disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the  
whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans.  
This makes the white man fear democracy. 
 
But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution  
which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true  
that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political  
division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so  
will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent  
half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not  
change that policy . . . .2 
Mandela’s extraordinary personal qualities notwithstanding, his 
insistence on addressing the fears of his white oppressors – an almost absurd 
posture, given their overwhelming power over him – was an integral feature 
of the political movement of which he was part. The ANC adopted a robust 
approach to engaging the white minority, an approach that bordered on 
radical empathy: even in the darkest days of oppression, it clearly and 
persistently promoted a vision of equality and respect for whites, too, in a 
post-Apartheid South Africa. 
The South African case invites a broader inquiry into the question of how 
activists for justice and human rights talk to and about the oppressor. The 
first part of this article will explore the ways in which the ANC and its allies 
spoke to and about the white minority during the period of Apartheid. What 
underlay the ANC’s commitment not just to non-racialism but also to 
actively reassuring the white minority, even as that minority brutally and 
often fatally oppressed the black majority? How did the ANC continue to 
address the fears of the oppressor, even as it launched an armed struggle 
against the white government and, at various points in time, made strategic 
decisions to exclude whites from its membership? To what extent did the 
ANC’s articulation of a vision that included a role for whites contribute to its 
ability to build a broad-based movement, garner international solidarity, and 
ultimately, reduce the perceived cost of ceding power for whites? What 
substantive compromises did that engagement require of the ANC 
leadership, and what is the legacy of those compromises? Much has been 
written about the ANC’s engagement of the white minority during 
negotiations to end Apartheid, and as part of a process of reconciliation after 
democracy was established.3 In contrast, this article focuses on the approach 
                                                          
2.  Nelson Mandela, Speech at Rivonia Trial before the Pretoria Supreme Court (Apr. 20, 1964), 
available at https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/i-am-prepared-die-nelson-mandelas-
statement-dock-opening-defence-case-rivonia-trial-pretoria (accessed Feb. 15, 2019). 
3. See e.g., Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory (2011); Robert Harvey, The Fall of 
Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki (2001); Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside 
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of activists to whites during the decades of Apartheid in which the 
government refused to talk directly to the ANC and reconciliation was a 
distant dream. 
The second part of this article will briefly explore insights from the South 
African experience that might be useful in other contexts, especially 
Israel/Palestine. I will explore tactical, strategic, and moral benefits that 
robust engagement with the oppressor may confer. I will also address 
objections to paying too much attention to the fears and concerns of the 
dominant group.4 
I offer a note on definitions: By “oppressor” I refer to groups or 
institutions in power that violate the rights of others – those who abuse 
authority. In doing so, I do not imply that every member of a dominant group 
is guilty of oppression. I do suggest that members of dominant groups bear 
responsibility for abuses committed by those who claim to represent them. 
When I use the word “engage” I mean how we talk to and about a group or 
authority, but not necessarily directly, including communications through 
public statements, songs, slogans, and writing. “Empathy” means the ability 
to imagine oneself in the situation of another, and, in this context, I define 
“radical empathy” as the ability to imagine yourself in the situation of 
someone who is actually hurting you. It is radical, because it is so difficult. 
 
Engaging the White Minority: A Case of Radical Empathy 
 
Apartheid, the system of racial domination formally in place in South 
Africa from 1948 to 1994, fell after geopolitical forces created an opening – 
and perhaps a necessity – for an end to white supremacist rule. The collapse 
of the former Soviet Union weakened the trump card that the whites-only 
South African government had held vis-à-vis the United States and Europe, 
namely that majority rule by Africans would bring Communist forces into 
power, given the affiliations between the ANC and the South African 
Communist party. The Soviet Union’s collapse also deprived the ANC of its 
primary financial and military backer, motivating it to negotiate a resolution.  
External pressure strengthened internal pressure within South Africa for 
change. The South African economy, predicated on the exploitation of 
unskilled and disenfranchised workers for mineral extraction, farming, and 
service provision, had become unsustainable, and the business community 
saw its future outside the Apartheid regime. Violent resistance to the 
Apartheid regime grew, and the government’s ability to control the streets 
                                                          
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2001); Desmond Tutu, No Truth Without 
Forgiveness (1999). 
4. This article is the product of ongoing research, supported by a Robina Foundation human 
rights fellowship at Yale Law School, to examine the way in which activists for justice in 
Israel/Palestine relate to and about Israelis as the dominant group, with some comparisons to 
the anti-Apartheid struggle. The observations shared here are a work-in-progress, reflecting 27 
interviews conducted thus far with human rights activists and intellectuals active in 
Israel/Palestine, South Africa and the United States, as well as ongoing documentary research 
and analysis. 
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deteriorated.5 These and other factors created space to end a horrific system 
of racial domination. 
Yet majority rule would have been an unlikely outcome without the 
efforts of anti-Apartheid activists who worked for decades to build a 
movement and position it to seize the opportunity for change. Mass 
mobilization of activists on the ground had contributed to making South 
Africa ungovernable. The armed wing of the ANC, the MK, put pressure on 
the government through acts of sabotage and, to a lesser extent, violence 
against people. Decades of organizing by the ANC leadership in exile and 
mobilization of a global solidarity movement created diplomatic pressure on 
the ruling National party to cede power. The release of political prisoners 
and the unbanning of opposition political parties led to a spiral of changes 
that culminated in direct negotiations between the ANC and the 
government, mass protests and escalating violence on the streets, a whites-
only referendum in favor of changing the system, and, ultimately, 
democratic elections in 1994. 
The 1994 elections were the realization of a founding credo of the ANC, 
one that would define and distinguish its political program from that of its 
political rivals: nonracialism. At a time when the South African government 
cultivated tribal identities and promoted a program of so-called separate 
development for the various ethnic groups, with whites at the top of the 
hierarchy, the ANC and its allies promoted its diametric opposite: a 
universalist approach to citizenship, in which South Africans of all races 
would enjoy equal rights. 
That vision took account of historical injustice but also outlined a role for 
whites in South Africa with some detail. In 1943, the ANC and its partners 
compiled the African Claims document in response to the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter, which outlined the war aims of the World War II Allies. The 
document calls for a repeal of discriminatory legislation and practices, fair 
and just redistribution of land that whites took from Africans and policies to 
redress additional wrongs.6  One of the authors, ANC president Alfred 
Xuma, wrote in the preface that the struggle would continue until “freedom, 
right and justice are won for all races and colours.”7 The ANC and its 
partners further developed that vision in 1955, when they convened the 
Congress of the People, a participatory process in which black, colored, 
Indian, and white activists compiled and collected community input into 
what would become the Freedom Charter.8 A white South African 
communist, Rusty Bernstein, is said to have drafted the document, which 
opens with the declaration that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
black and white.”9 It outlines an inclusive vision of equality, in which rights 
                                                          
5. Shapiro, supra note 3 at 93-94. 
6. African National Congress, Africans’ Claims in South Africa (Dec. 14, 1943) 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/africans-claims-south-africa-14-december-1943-alfred-
xuma (accessed Apr. 27, 2019). 
7. Id. 
8. Saul Dubow, Apartheid 1948-1994 69-70 (2014). 
9. Author’s interview with Hugh Macmillan (Oct. 16, 2018). See also Nana Osei-Opare, 
Communism and the Tutelage of African Agency: Revisiting Mandela’s Communist Ties, 38(1) 
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are protected on a universal basis, even as wrongs perpetrated by the white 
minority against the non-white majority are redressed.10 
Later, after the government banned the ANC and many of its allies, ANC 
leaders continued to develop their political vision from exile, mostly in 
neighboring countries where they sought refuge. In 1969, the ANC issued 
the “Strategy and Tactics” document from its conference in Morogoro, 
Tanzania, calling for an overthrow of the Apartheid regime and including 
the following message, which is striking for its insistence on outlining a role 
for the oppressor in an imagined just future: 
Our nationalism must not be confused with the chauvinism or narrow  
nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the  
classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain  
ascendency so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of  
the mass … The white people who now monopolise the land have made  
South Africa their home and are historically part of the South African  
population and as such entitled to land.11 
Over the years, ANC leaders and their allies repeated that message: to 
domestic and foreign audiences, in official policy documents, in 
underground propaganda documents and radio broadcasts, and eventually 
in private conversations with members of the Afrikaner ruling elite. ANC 
leader Oliver Tambo’s 1976 speech to the United Nations General Assembly 
promised to “liberate the oppressor.”12 The 1983 launching of the United 
Democratic Front, a coalition of anti-Apartheid groups strongly influenced 
by the ANC, called for inclusive nonracialism.13 In 1987, a delegation of 
Afrikaans-speaking scholars, artists and professionals traveled to Dakar to 
meet with ANC leaders in-exile. At that meeting, Thabo Mbeke, an ANC 
leader who would succeed Mandela as president, introduced himself as an 
“Afrikaner.”14 
I call this approach to the white minority “radical empathy,” because it 
went beyond simply stating universalist views, which would of course 
include whites as rights-bearers in a regime to be created based on principles 
of justice and human rights. Directly and consistently addressing white fears 
of majority rule required ANC activists to imagine themselves in the 
situation of whites, to identify and name their concerns and to offer 
responses to them. 
                                                          
UFAHAMU-A JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES 69, 78 (2014), 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt43d050xv/qt43d050xv.pdf (accessed Apr. 27, 2019). 
10. For example, the Freedom Charter declares that national wealth shall be restored to the 
people, land will be re-divided and people may occupy land “wherever they choose”. 
http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-
jpeg.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2019). 
11. African National Congress, Strategy and Tactics of the ANC (1969), 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/keydocs.html (accessed Apr. 21, 2019).  
12. Oliver Tambo, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, New York, October 
26, 1976, in OLIVER TAMBO: APARTHEID AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1991), 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Tambo-
Apartheid%20and%20Interntional%20Community.pdf (accessed Apr. 22, 2019) 
13. Dubow, supra note 9 at 208.  
14. Id. at 245. 
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The principle of nonracialism was far from uncontested among activists. 
The Africanist faction within the ANC called for the creation of an African 
state, which might admit non-Africans, but only on the basis of allegiance to 
African nationalism.15 In 1958, the Africanists splintered from the ANC, 
forming the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) the following year.16 The creation 
of the PAC reinforced the ANC’s commitment to nonracialism, now a 
position that distinguished its political platform from that of its main rival. 
In the wake of the split, ANC leaders reaffirmed their inclusive vision. In 
1959, ANC leader Walter Sisulu described what he called the “broad 
humanism” of the ANC: 
[Our message] claims equality but not domination for the African  
people, and regards South Africa as being big enough and rich enough  
to sustain all its people, of whatever origin, in friendship and peace . . .  
Congress has repudiated the idea of ‘driving the white man into the sea’  
as futile and reactionary, and accepted the fact that the various racial  
groups in South Africa have come to stay. Congress has at all times  
welcomed and taken the initiative in achieving cooperation with other  
organizations representing different population groups provided always  
that such cooperation was on a basis of equality and disinterested  
adherence to mutual aims.17 
Although the ultimate goal was nonracialism, in organizing resistance 
and opposition, ANC leaders took into account the reality of racial divisions 
under Apartheid and the overwhelming power dynamics they created. Until 
1969, the ANC worked with non-black allies through a coalition of 
“congresses” organized along racial lines: the Indian Congress, the Colored 
People’s Congress, and the Congress of Democrats (for whites).18 ANC 
activists worried that if whites were admitted as members, they would 
dominate the congress, given their privilege, including greater mobility, 
better education, more wealth, and less vulnerability to the brutality of the 
regime.19 The reality of racial segregation also meant that organizing was 
mostly along racial lines: “people live in segregated areas, and in order to 
mobilize, we’ve got to go to where the people are,” said a member of the 
ANC Youth League. “It is a lot easier, for example, for an Indian to go and 
mobilize the Indians in his area, or a white amongst the whites.”20 Indeed, 
concerns about white activists hijacking the struggle against Apartheid 
occupied the ANC leadership, many of whom left South Africa when the 
ANC was banned in 1960. The Congress structure became harder to maintain 
in exile.21 In 1966, the Colored People’s Congress dissolved and joined the 
rival PAC. And, in 1969, the ANC leadership decided to admit non-Africans 
                                                          
15. See e.g., Pan Africanist Congress Constitution of 1959, Art. 2, https://pac.org.za/1959-
constitution/ (accessed Apr. 27, 2019). 
16. Dubow, supra note 9 at 74. 
17. Walter Sisulu, Congress and the Africanists, AFRICA SOUTH (Sept. 1959), in Julie Frederikse, 
THE UNBREAKABLE THREAD: NON-RACIALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 80 (1990). 
18. Ibid. 
19. See e.g., Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, supra note 1. 
20. Frederikse, supra note 18 at 78. 
21. Dubow supra note 9 at 135. 
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as members, but not to the executive committee that led the group. The result 
was a “revolutionary council” that included Indian, colored, and white 
members, together with blacks.22 In 1985, the ANC admitted whites, Indians, 
and colored people to its executive committee, as well. 
The commitment to nonracialism – and the practice of addressing white 
fears – did not negate organized armed resistance, including acts of violence 
that targeted security officers but killed civilians, as well.23 The MK, the 
armed wing of the ANC, included fighters from all races and remained active 
as late as 1990.24 It was a means of pressuring the Afrikaner government, as 
was the campaign of the 1980s to render South Africa “ungovernable” by 
violently expelling security forces from black communities.25 The ANC’s 
public messaging addressing the fears of whites was one of a range of tactics 
that included mass mobilization within South Africa, armed struggle, 
building international support, and eventually political negotiations for the 
transition to democracy. 
Whether or not ANC leaders intended to reassure whites – and some 
ANC activists interviewed said they were simply describing their goal of 
nonracialism, without consciously responding to white fears – the insistence 
on consistently and credibly outlining a role for whites in the ANC’s political 
vision appears to have conferred at least three tactical benefits. 
First, the ANC’s message of inclusiveness allowed it to form strategic 
partnerships with white South Africans, peeling off layers of support for the 
regime from within the dominant group and also benefiting from the work 
of white activists whose privileged position allowed them to operate more 
freely.26 In the 1980s, the multi-racial Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the United Democratic Front (UDF), influential allies 
of the ANC, were able to operate openly within South Africa while the ANC 
was banned, playing an important role in mobilizing mass support.27 The 
ANC interacted with white student protest movements and activists 
opposing mandatory military conscription for white men, encouraging such 
activities and producing propaganda pamphlets aimed at those target 
groups: student protestors, men detained for refusing military conscription, 
and the parents of the detainees.28  ANC activists interviewed for this project 
emphasized that the thrust of the recruiting effort inside South Africa was 
                                                          
22. Dubow, supra note 9 at 147. 
23. Aboobaker Ismail, the MK operative who planned the 1983 Church Street bombing that 
killed 19 people, including civilians, later told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that the 
bombing was justified, despite the anticipated civilian casualties: “We wanted whites to come 
out of their comfort zones and feel the pain and suffering of the black people. We wanted to 
bring them to their senses.” ANC Mastermind Campaign Justifies Pretoria Church Street Blast, 
SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION (May 6, 1998), 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1998/9805/s980506b.htm (accessed Apr. 21, 2019). 
24. White Jewish Communist leader Joe Slovo served as the chief of staff of MK even before 
whites were allowed into the civilian leadership of the ANC. 
25. Harvey, supra note 4 at 192. 
26. For example, white activists purchased the Rivonia farm that served as a headquarters 
for the MK armed wing, because blacks were not allowed to buy land in Johannesburg. White 
lawyers represented many of the ANC members in political trials. 
27. Harvey, supra note 4 at 98-99. 
28. Interview with ANC activists (Dec. 5, 2018). 
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mass mobilization of the black majority, but that efforts were also made to 
mobilize support among white religious leaders, intellectuals, student 
protestors, and anti-conscriptionists.29 The prominent, visible involvement of 
whites in the struggle, in turn, shored up support for nonracialism among 
black activists, who worked with some whites as allies and who also suffered 
from the brutality of black collaborators with the Apartheid regime, most 
notably police officers. 
Second, the ANC’s inclusive platform helped it gain international 
support. The 1956 Treason Trial, in which 156 activists from all races were 
initially accused of treason, provided an opportunity for activists to 
communicate with a global audience, through foreign media coverage of the 
activists’ statements.  “Defendants skilfully [sic] used the courtroom to 
publicize the anti-apartheid message in South Africa and abroad, and the 
world took notice,” wrote historian Saul Dubow.30 The anti-Apartheid 
solidary movement in the United States and the United Kingdom – 
composed mostly of white people, reflecting the majority-white population 
of those countries  – gave its support to the ANC program, which they saw 
as consistent with domestic principles of majority rule and formal equality 
among all citizens. That global solidarity movement eventually managed to 
push through economic sanctions on South Africa that also played a role in 
making Apartheid difficult to maintain.31 
Third, while the white minority faced significant economic, security, and 
diplomatic pressure to end racial domination, the fact that the ANC’s 
program included a role for them cannot be disqualified as a factor that 
encouraged the National Party to cede power before a full-fledged civil war 
erupted. The first influential group within white society to initiate 
negotiations with the ANC was the Anglo business community. In the 1980s, 
they sent representatives to neighboring countries where ANC leaders lived 
and trained in exile, to begin to talk about a post-apartheid South Africa. 
Other white thought leaders followed.32 There were many factors influencing 
the decision of the National Party to begin negotiating with Nelson Mandela 
in prison in the 1980s, to release political prisoners and unban the ANC and 
other groups in 1990, and, in 1992, to hold a referendum among white voters, 
in which they voted to continue the political process.33 The fact that the ANC, 
however, robustly described the equal status of whites to which it aspired 
made it safer for the white minority to consider ceding its privilege. Of 
course, the white minority did not do so willingly: the country was becoming 
ungovernable, infrastructure was breaking down, the economy was 
collapsing, and sanctions had rendered South Africa an international pariah. 
But whites could have made the transition longer and bloodier had they not 
seen a role for themselves in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
                                                          
29. Interviews with ANC activists (Dec 5, 2018),(Feb. 20, 2018),(Mar. 5, 2019). 
30. Dubow supra note 9 at 71. 
31. Harvey, supra note 4 at 102. 
32. Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-
1990 239-41 (1991). 
33. Mandela, supra note 2. 
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This approach to the white minority was controversial. The Africanists 
who formed the PAC accused the ANC of allowing the white minority to 
benefit from its theft of land and resources, for example, by not going far 
enough in demanding redistribution and restitution of land that European 
settlers stole from the indigenous peoples of South Africa and the African 
ethnic groups that migrated there: “African emancipation could only be 
realized by the return of the land that had been taken away,” said one ANC 
member who broke with the Congress to join the PAC.34  Important 
concessions such as respecting private property rights (even where the 
property was ill-gotten) and amnesty for Apartheid-related crimes, in the 
form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, were a product of 
negotiations with the white ruling elite. 
Twenty-five years after democracy, some in South Africa, especially 
younger people who grew up after the toppling of Apartheid, blame the 
ANC’s approach to the white minority for the dismal failure to redistribute 
the country’s wealth.35 Economic apartheid continues in South Africa, with 
among the highest levels of inequality in the world and persistent, stubborn 
poverty and unemployment. As of 2017, blacks comprised 80 percent of 
South Africa’s population but hold just 4 percent of the farms owned by 
individuals.36 Unofficial unemployment in 2017 was 31 percent for blacks 
and 7 percent for whites.37 Whites on average earn 4.5 times as much as 
blacks.38 The Economic Freedom Fighters, a political party co-founded by an 
expelled member of the ANC Youth League in 2013, advances a more radical 
program of redistribution, and there are active debates within South Africa 
about changing the constitutional provision that protects property owners 
from having their property seized without compensation.39 South African 
decolonization activists, especially young people, blame the persistent 
poverty and inequality on the legacy of the ANC’s nonracialism, noting the 
alliances the ANC formed with the white business community and its 
assurances not to make radical changes to an economy founded on white 
dominance. That decision, they say, set the ANC on a path that, after 
liberation, would deter it from making fundamental changes in the 
                                                          
34. Frederikse, supra note 13 at 72. 
35. See e.g., Wanelisa Xaba, Why Apartheid Must Never Be Forgiven, THE DAILY VOX (Feb. 7, 
2017), https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/why-apartheid-must-never-be-forgiven-wanelisa-
xaba/ (accessed Apr. 30, 2019) 
36. Republic of South Africa, Rural Development and Land Reform Department, Land Audit 
Report - Phase II: Private Land Ownership by Race, Gender and Nationality 2 (Nov. 2017), 
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/publications/land-audit-report/file/6126 (accessed 
Apr. 22, 2019). 
37. Lynsey Chutel, Here’s South Africa’s Desperately High Unemployment in Four Charts, 
QUARTZ AFRICA (June 2, 2017), https://qz.com/africa/997358/south-africas-unemployment-is-
at-a-fourteen-year-high/.  
38. Statistics South Africa, Living Conditions of Households in South Africa: An Analysis of 
Household Expenditure and Income Data Using the LCS 2014/2015 15 (Jan. 27, 2017),  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0310/P03102014.pdf (accessed Apr. 22, 2019).  
39. See e.g., Antony Sguazzin and Amogelang Mbatha, For Black South Africans, Land Seizure 
Is a Question of Justice, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-23/for-black-south-africans-land-
seizure-is-a-question-of-justice (accessed Apr. 22, 2019). 
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ownership structure of the South African economy. That debate continues, 
as South Africans forge their future, burdened by the legacy of the past.40 
In a technical sense, ending political apartheid could be accomplished by 
changing electoral rules and creating a new constitution. But undoing the 
massive poverty, inequality, spatial disruption, and unequal access to 
services created by centuries of dispossession and theft is a daunting and 
long-term program. My view is that the persistence of economic apartheid 
has more to do with the enormity of the task and mistakes made by the ANC 
once it took power, rather than the stance it adopted toward the white 
minority during the struggle against apartheid and even during negotiations 
for a transition toward majority rule. The ANC’s plan, dating back to the 
African Claims document of 1943, included robust provisions for 
redistribution and redistributive justice, to be implemented once black South 
Africans gained political power. It won a victory in negotiations when the 
Nationalist Party agreed to majority rule, rather than the minority rights 
model the Afrikaner minority tried to obtain, citing its fears of reverse 
domination. Majority rule provided at least the technical tools to undertake 
the program of redistribution that the ANC had promised. The ANC, 
however, has struggled to perform well since its transition to becoming a 
governing party,41 and corruption is endemic, even at the highest levels.42 
Under the best of circumstances and with the best of leadership, 
rehabilitating South Africans from white supremacist domination would be 
a formidable task, and few would give the ANC high marks for its progress 
on that front. 43 
 
Beyond South Africa 
 
Domination, subjugation, and abuse of authority are fundamental to any 
system of oppression, but their manifestations are also unique to a particular 
set of circumstances. Anti-Apartheid activists succeeded in taking advantage 
of an opportunity for a democratic transition by adopting strategies that fit 
                                                          
40. Ibid. For additional context, see a leaked memo by the Thabo Mbeki Foundation 
addressing the controversy over whether to redistribute land without compensation, What Then 
About Land Expropriation Without Compensation?, THABO MBEKI FOUNDATION (Sept. 2018), 
https://37ugp72ofspp25ltkb3ajwvg-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/TMF-
NDR.pdf.  
41. The Journal of Southern African Studies, for example, dedicated an issue to an 
evaluation of the ANC’s performance as a governing party. 31 JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
STUDIES 4 (2005). See also Roger Southall, The ANC for Sale? Money, Morality & Business in South 
Africa, 35 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 116, 281 (2008). 
42. South Africa’s third president in the post-Apartheid era, Jacob Zuma, was forced out of 
power in 2018 amid persistent allegations of corruption. He is now facing trial for some of those 
charges. Norimitsi Onishi, Jacob Zuma to Be Prosecuted on Corruption Charges, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/world/africa/jacob-zuma-south-
africa-corruption.html (accessed Apr. 27, 2019). 
43. See e.g., An Incomplete Transition: Overcoming the Legacy of Exclusion in South Africa: Report 
No. 125838-ZA, WORLD BANK 
(Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29793/WBG-South-Africa-
Systematic-Country-Diagnostic-FINAL-for-board-SECPO-Edit-
05032018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed Apr. 21, 2019). 
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the particular problem of Apartheid in South Africa, at particular moments 
in time. Yet the tactical and strategic advantages that robust engagement 
with the dominant group conferred on anti-Apartheid activists may be 
relevant to other contexts, as well, especially where dominance is based on 
ethnic, national, religious, or racial identity. In the second part of this article 
I briefly explore objections to robust engagement with the dominant group, 




There are a number of objections to the approach I have described here 
– robust engagement of the fears of the dominant group. I want to note here 
just a few of them, including some articulated by activists working in 
Israel/Palestine, culled from interviews I have conducted thus far as part of 
this research project. I will also offer some preliminary responses to these 
objections. 
The first objection is that reassuring the oppressor – outlining a role of 
equality for the dominant group and inviting its members into joint action – 
ignores the power dynamics that exist between the dominant group and the 
dominated group, essentially replicating relations of domination into the 
activist community. This is a serious objection that requires careful thought, 
especially in deciding how to incorporate members of the dominant group 
into a movement for justice and how to communicate to and about that 
group. In the context of Israel/Palestine, there is a problematic legacy of so-
called coexistence or dialogue efforts, funded by Western governments 
during the interim period of the Oslo peace accords in the 1990s, that 
presented Israelis and Palestinians as equals who needed to learn to live 
together, erasing the reality of occupation and domination. The anti-
normalization movement within Palestinian society reflects this negative 
experience, and in principle it opposes any joint work with Israelis that is not 
based on resisting the occupation.44 
One possible response to this problem is to be deliberate about naming 
power. We might take these power relations into consideration in deciding 
whether and how to incorporate members of the dominant group into 
movements for justice and also what kinds of messaging to use to 
communicate (including and perhaps especially indirectly) with the 
dominant group. At different phases of the life of a movement, it may or may 
not be desirable for members of the dominant group to work together with 
those seeking liberation from domination. For example, at an early phase of 
movement building, those belonging to the oppressed group may need to 
organize separately, to mobilize their communities and to avoid the risk of 
even inadvertent domination by like-minded activists belonging to a group 
that has better access to resources and mechanisms of power. The question 
                                                          
44. See e.g., Debating BDS: On Normalization and Partial Boycotts, PALESTINIAN CAMPAIGN FOR 
THE ACADEMIC AND CULTURAL BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (Jan. 4, 2012), 
https://bdsmovement.net/news/debating-bds-normalization-and-partial-boycotts-1 
(accessed Apr. 27, 2019). 
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of how to work with members of the dominant group – whether as part of a 
joint movement or separately with coordination – is a tactical question that 
is distinct, however, from the question of what posture to adopt toward the 
oppressor and how to talk to and about members of the dominant group. 
A second objection is that acknowledging and being responsive to the 
narrative of the oppressor will dilute or negate the narrative of the 
oppressed. Reassuring the oppressor risks giving legitimacy to the fears of 
the dominant group, even when such fears are based on dehumanizing 
characterizations of the oppressed. One example is the tension between 
reassuring Israelis and their allies about security risks without affirming a 
warped narrative that pits Israeli security against Palestinian rights as a zero-
sum game, reinforcing negative images of Palestinians and downplaying the 
threats to Palestinian security. But is not it possible to respond to the fears of 
the oppressor while remaining true to the narrative of the oppressed? Is there 
not a way to present the narrative of the oppressed in a true and principled 
way, while still taking into account how it will be heard by the dominant 
group? In the context of Israel/Palestine, centuries of anti-Semitism, 
primarily in Europe and culminating in genocide during the Nazi Holocaust, 
have fed existential fears among Jewish people. It is also true that the legacy 
of the Holocaust has been used to justify Israeli oppression of Palestinians. 
Acknowledging the fears of Israeli Jews and their historical context, 
however, need not come at the expense of acknowledging the persecution of 
Palestinians at the hands of Israeli Jewish authorities, including violence, 
dispossession, discrimination, and exile. It is possible, I think, to respond 
thoughtfully to existential Jewish fears, rooted in historical experiences of 
persecution, while repudiating the demonization of Palestinians as agents of 
that persecution. 
A third objection is one of fairness – whether it is fair to ask the victim to 
reassure the oppressor. Doing so may require enormous reserves of energy 
that would then be redirected from other tasks. Being asked to respond to 
the fears of the dominant group can also re-traumatize victims.  One 
response here is to think carefully about who in the movement is tasked with 
communicating to and about the dominant group. One of the many 
advantages of a broad-based movement is that different people can play 
different roles. It may be that Israelis or Jewish foreigners are well-situated 
to do the heavy lifting of communication and engaging Israeli and Jewish 
fears. If engaging the oppressor is traumatic for some members of the 
oppressed group, they can leave the implementation of that task to others. 
A fourth objection is that taking seriously the fears of the oppressor and 
responding to them will lead to substantive compromises, for example 
adopting positions that cede too much, at the expense of remedying injustice. 
I think it is possible to take “hard” positions – to insist on radical change – 
while still communicating respect, empathy, and responsiveness. It is hard 
for the dominant group to hear demands for it to cede its privilege. But 
whatever the substantive demands are, being mindful of how human rights 
activists communicate them to the dominant group can make even a bitter 
pill a bit easier to swallow. In the context of Israel/Palestine, for example, the 
12
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right of return for Palestinian refugees who fled or were expelled during the 
1948 Mideast War is a red flag for most Zionists, including liberal Zionists 
who oppose the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank but want Israel to 
remain a majority-Jewish state and therefore oppose admitting large 
numbers of Palestinians. There are a few creative examples of those who 
support the right of return making efforts to reassure Israelis, including by 
imagining what return might look like.45 Demands that seem inconceivable 
to the dominant group – for example, majority rule in South Africa – can 
become conceivable over a long period of time, as circumstances change and 
as activists put forward an alternative vision of the future that is attractive to 
the dominant group, as well. Of course, an alternative vision of the future 





Any pitfalls of robustly engaging the oppressor should be weighed 
against the tactical benefits it might confer, which, depending on the context, 
may be substantial. 
First, the way activists for justice talk about the dominant group has 
implications for their ability to build a broad movement, whether through 
direct cooperation, loose associations, indirect coordination, sporadic 
communications, or something in between. Even where a program is radical 
by the terms of the current regime – in South Africa, for example, the 
transition from minority rule based on white supremacy to majority rule 
based on universal citizenship – acknowledging and addressing the fears 
and interests of the dominant group can broaden the range of allies with 
whom “radicals” can partner. Describing the place of the dominant group in 
a transformed society may make it possible for revolutionaries – those who 
want to fundamentally change the system – to forge tactical (and not 
necessarily direct) alliances with reformers who may support part but not all 
of the revolutionary program and may be highly sensitive to the fate of the 
dominant group in that program. In particular, where activists take the time 
to engage seriously with the dominant group and describe their vision of the 
place for the former oppressor in a transformed society, they may be able to 
cultivate allies from within the dominant group and its sphere of influence. 
Whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks is a tactical question, and 
the answer may change across movements and through different stages of a 
single movement. Being deliberate and clear about the role for the dominant 
group, however, opens the door to the possibility of broader partnerships, 
where such partnerships are deemed to do more good than harm. 
Second, robust engagement with the oppressor, including a program for 
how the dominant group will be integrated into a post-oppression society, 
can help win external support, including through global solidarity 
movements. The moral appeal of a program that takes seriously the role of 
                                                          
45. The Israeli NGO “Zochrot” is an example of this type of work: www.zochrot.org.  
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the dominant group can help make the alternative that activists propose 
more attractive to supporters around the world, many of whom are 
motivated by an ideological commitment to universal values such as justice, 
fairness and human rights. Failing to outline a role for the dominant group 
in a program of change may make outsiders doubt the sincerity of activists’ 
commitment to those values. 
Third, over a very long period of time, robust engagement with the 
dominant group can reduce the perceived cost of ceding privilege and make 
its members less resistant to change. This advantage should not be 
overstated. Members of a dominant group rarely cede power voluntarily, but 
if they do not see a place for themselves in a transformed society, they may 
be more likely to fight to the end to maintain hegemony, because ceding 
dominance appears to threaten their very existence. Offering the dominant 
group a viable alternative – equality to replace privilege – gives them a 
horizon and a non-suicidal path to choose, if and when there is enough 
pressure for change. In outlining a vision of equality, activists should, of 
course, take into account the need for restorative justice for the oppressed 
group. Restorative justice, however, need not mean reverse domination. If 
activists indeed strive for a just future for everyone – saying so clearly and 





For the many circumstances in which the dominant group will continue 
to live with the formerly oppressed, outlining the place of the former 
oppressor in a transformed society is also of immense strategic value. In 
settler-colonial societies such as South Africa, Israel, and the United States—
each with its own unique manifestation of settler-colonialism—the dominant 
group is not going to leave. Any vision of change has to account for the 
impossibility, short of committing atrocities, of expelling the dominant 
group and therefore the necessity to consider how the former oppressed and 
oppressor will live together in a transformed society. Grappling with those 
difficult issues will affect the substantive program that activists pursue, 
including the economic, social, and political structures and principles they 
envision and seek to actualize. Outlining a role for the former oppressor can 
take the form of a detailed program or be articulated more generally, based 
on principles, but failing to address what will happen to the dominant group 
can render the program for change inadequate. It may defer or inhibit 
important but difficult discussions about alternatives to the current system, 




For human rights activists promoting a universal, rights-based view of 
how societies should be organized, there may also be an ethical imperative 
to taking seriously the role of the dominant group in the future they wish to 
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build. Do human rights activists have a responsibility to explicitly include 
the dominant group in their vision of a just future? Appropriately so, change-
makers point to the responsibilities of the dominant group to change its 
course of action. But activists mobilize against oppression because, by 
definition, the oppressor is flouting its responsibilities. What are the 
responsibilities of the oppressed and those who advocate on their behalf? 
I am still thinking through this idea, but I think that engaging in the 
difficult challenge of recognizing the humanity even of the oppressor can 
deepen the commitment of human rights activists to the universal values that 
underpin their work. The struggle to achieve radical empathy for the 





The ideas presented in this article reflect an exploration in process. I 
acknowledge the many differences between the struggle against white 
supremacy in South Africa and the struggle for justice in Israel/Palestine, 
and I do not purport to develop a model that is universally applicable. I do 
think, however, that activists for justice in Israel/Palestine – including 
Palestinian, foreign, and Israeli activists – could benefit from a more 
thoughtful consideration of how they talk to and about Israelis and Zionists, 
and that the ANC’s approach offers some useful lessons. At the heart of the 
issue is the question of vision. Human rights activists, perhaps 
understandably, focus on human rights abuses, describing the conduct that 
we do not want. But spending more time talking about what we do want – 
even at the level of principles and values – will necessarily require more 
deliberate articulations about the place for the dominant group in our vision 
of a just future. That vision can take the form of a detailed political program 
but might also be a more deliberate, robust, and frequently repeated 
description of how stated goals such as justice, fairness, equality, and 
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